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Redression as a Structural Imperative in Shaffer's Equus 
Thomas Akstens 
In a note prefaced to the printed text of his play Equus, Peter Shaffer 
offers praise for John Dexter, the director of the original London production: 
"Dexter directs powerfully through suggestion. Into the theatrical spaces he 
contrives, flows the communal imagination of an audience" (7). Shaffer's 
statement tells us more about his own conception of the theatrical experience 
than it does about the method or merit of Dexter's direction. At first reading, 
the statement may seem somewhat aphoristic: the notion that drama is 
communal has been a commonplace of dramatic theory. But when we 
consider that Equus is a play predicated on the dichotomy of deviance and 
normalcy, it becomes apparent that Shaffer's reference to "the communal 
imagination of an audience" invites us to redefine the nature and function of 
the communality of the theatrical audience. Further, it provides us with a 
point of departure toward understanding why Equus is the play that it is—a 
play in which the ethos of the audience is critical to both the determination of 
structure and the resolution of conflict. 
Writers of plays, it seems, have been habitually aware of a prevailing 
disposition of shared expectations, assumptions and values in their various 
audiences~what I refer to in this paper as the ethos of the audience.1 Recent 
drama theorists have acknowledged that the communality of the audience, of 
which the ethos is a manifestation, is a significant determinant of what happens 
in the theater.2 At the same time, critical emphasis has seemed to shift 
progressively toward a consideration of the psychology of audience response 
as a creative force in the theatrical event. Marco De Marinis, for one, has 
concluded that 
theatrical pleasure arises and is maintained in an unbroken dialectic 
between the frustration and satisfaction of [the audience's] 
expectations. . . . To upset this balance in either direction means 
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threatening the success of the complex communicative interactions 
which constitute the very life of the theatrical performance. (112) 
It is somewhat puzzling to note that De Marinis, throughout his provocative 
analysis, makes no overt differentiation between the singular spectator and the 
plural audience. When he asserts that "the spectator is a relatively 
autonomous 'maker of meanings' for the performance; its cognitive and 
emotive effects can only be truly actualized by the audience," (102) one 
wonders why "spectator" does not read "spectators," for the collectivity (if not 
the communality) of the audience is implicit in his entire argument. As De 
Marinis himself takes some pains to point out with reference to the 
manipulation of theatrical environments, the audience of the 1967 Living 
Theater production of Antigone became "the people of Argu[sic]s" (106)—a 
political entity, not an assemblage of individuals. It is precisely in the 
communality of the audience that the psychology, anthropology and politics of 
the theater converge. The autonomy of the spectator is a collective autonomy. 
Many of the rhetorical conventions of drama—choruses, prologues and 
speeches or actions that deliberately subvert dramatic illusion-are devices by 
which writers of drama have attempted to reconcile (or sometimes exploit) the 
immediate tension between the subjective integrity of the literary text and the 
communal expectations of the audience, as part of the process through which 
a theatrical text3 is actualized. When Tom Stoppard's Guildenstern peers out 
over the footlights and complains, "What a fine persecution-to be kept 
intrigued without ever being quite enlightened" (41), we are given to 
understand that his problem is pretty much the same as our problem at this 
moment in the play. We are all in the same metaphysical pickle, because none 
of us has enough immediate information to know what Stoppard is up to-yet 
we are all necessarily implicated, in our roles as performer or audience, in the 
creation of a theatrical text. It is noteworthy in this regard that Sartre coined 
his remarkable phrase "theatrical procedure" (Genet 10)-which appears to 
acknowledge that the actualization of a theatrical text is itself a fundamentally 
conventionalized undertaking-in his discussion of the cognitive "de-realization" 
(13) which confounds spectators of a crossgendered staging of Genet's The 
Maids. It is difficult to think of an instance in which the presumed ethos of 
the audience has had a more radical effect on the nature of the theatrical 
event. Jouvet's decision to countermand Genet's wishes and cast the play with 
women in the roles of Solange, Claire and Madame profoundly affected the 
theatrical text of 17 April 1947 and of any subsequent production, regardless 
of the physiological gender of the players. 
It must also be observed that the structural conventions of certain 
dramatic idioms have existed to help reconcile the desires of the playwright 
with the demands of the audience. In his examination of one such convention, 
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Northrop Frye demonstrated convincingly that the "festive" ending of 
Elizabethan comedy and romance was more than just a charming trope; it was 
a deliberate attempt to satisfy the audience's expectations of a harmonious 
conclusion and an orderly resolution to the problems inherent in the action—a 
"desirable solution" (Frye 130). Moreover, Brecht's lampoon of Gay at the end 
of The Threepenny Opera reveals that the festive ending has been a convention 
with considerable stamina, that it retained enough force to be the target of a 
rather brutal comment by the omission of the obligatory dance in favor of a 
polemic song. Most importantly, Brecht's ending shows us that the audience's 
mandate for a harmonious resolution is actually an expression of social will—in 
this case, the sentimental desires of the bourgeoisie. 
Some earlier theorists argued that the politics of the communal audience 
is rooted in the ritual origins of theater and its refinement in the context of 
religious and community festivals. Martin Esslin stated this point of view 
succinctly: 
In ritual as in theater a human community directly experiences its 
own identity and affirms it. . . . All drama is therefore a political 
event: it either reasserts or undermines the code of conduct of a 
given society. (29) 
While no audience is homogeneous in an absolute sense, Esslin rightly 
contended that the viewers of drama have a political identity as an audience, 
and that they collectively share, and assert, certain assumptions about 
conformity and deviance. Moreover, the communis sensus of the audience has 
an affinity for normative behavior and a corresponding abhorrence of (and 
fascination with) chaos. 
Victor Turner's explorations of the "anthropology of performance" {From 
Ritual to Theater 13) provide us with still richer insights into the political 
dynamics of De Marinis' "unbroken dialectic" and the reflexive traffic between 
playwright and audience which is essential to the realization of a theatrical text. 
While Esslin's thesis was grounded in the historical notion that theater derives 
from ritual, Turner has emphasized instead that theater and ritual may be 
considered as rather distinct expressions of the same dynamic socio-cultural 
processes. Turner's model of the structure of conflict situations in the type of 
public actions he refers to as "social dramas" {From Ritual to Theatre 106) 
indicates that there may be concrete reasons why the continuum of frustration 
and satisfaction is integral to any dramatic event. Turner identifies four 
sequential stages of process—breach, crisis, redressive action and 
reintegration-which are part of a society's management of deviant or contra-
normal behaviors, "egoistic" behaviors which he further describes by a phrase 
of Frederick Bailey's: the "symbolic trigger of confrontation or encounter" 
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(1982:107). Throughout his discussion, Turner asserts an "explicit comparison 
of the temporal structure of certain types of social processes with that of 
dramas on the stage . . ." (110). We have seen that Frye focused his attention 
on the reintegration which occurs at the end of Shakespeare's romances—an 
emphasis on the coda which has been characteristic of critics who have 
considered the teleology of dramatic structures. But in Turner's exposition, 
the "redressive phase" of the process is equally crucial, the phase in which 
"symbolic action reach[es its] . . . fullest expression" (108). 
Turner's model suggests that a theatrical audience, confronted with a 
dramatic action in which vital norms of cultural and social harmony have been 
breached, would naturally exert its will on behalf of redression. It further 
suggests that in the case of a play like Equus, for which redression is the 
central problem of the action, the audience would experience the 
accomplishment of redression as a gratification of its communal expectations. 
It is impossible to read much commentary on Equus without encountering 
a vocabulary of shock and disgust at the action which precipitated the play. 
Shaffer's own account resounds with this vocabulary: "alarming 
. . . horrible . . . dreadful" {Equus 9). The anecdote which gave rise to the 
fable of Shaffer's play would seem to be a veritable archetype of deviance, 
simultaneously revolting and compelling. Shaffer tells us that he reacted 
himself to his friend's story of the boy and the horses with "an intense 
fascination" (9). 
In another place, Shaffer indicates that his reaction to the blinding of the 
horses compels him to call, in effect, for his own sort of redressive action: 
There is no question that the boy has done a criminal act, and that 
something must be done about it. There's no question that the boy 
himself is in deep pain and distress. . . . Dysart must do something 
about that, too. (Vogue 136) 
This suggests that, as in Turner's model, the breach or deviant act demands 
that the playwright, as well as the protagonist, undertake a redressive process, 
the final aim of which will be to permit some sort of reintegration. It is 
important to realize that both Shaffer and Dysart are subject to these 
imperatives. Indeed, Shaffer's statement in his "Note on the Play" could seem 
to apply to either: "I had to create a mental world in which the deed could be 
made comprehensible" (9). There is a structural imperative in operation from 
the earliest moments of Equus-m the literary text, even before the play itself 
begins. It vitiates the conflict of the play and gives an unsettling sense of 
inevitability to the choices which are made by both the author and his 
protagonist.4 
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At the very beginning of the play, Dysart speaks directly to the audience, 
not merely in a bit of character exposition, but as if to acknowledge that Alan's 
act will serve as a legitimate "trigger," in Bailey's sense: "The extremity is the 
point!" (18). We realize that Shaffer has called our attention to Dysart's role 
as a maker of the theatrical text, since the dramatic action which begins 
moments later is in apparent flashback. One of the first things Shaffer does 
is to call into question whether Dysart's response to the outrage committed by 
Alan will be consistent with the prevailing ethos: 
HESTER: Because most people are going to be disgusted by the 
whole thing, including doctors. 
DYSART: May I remind you that I share this room with two 
highly competent psychiatrists? 
HESTER: Bennett and Thoroughgood. They'll be as shocked as 
the public. 
DYSART: That's an absolutely unwarrantable statement. 
HESTER: Oh, they'll be cool and exact. And underneath they'll 
be revolted, and immovably English. Just like my 
bench. 
DYSART: Well, what am I? Polynesian? 
HESTER: You know exactly what I mean! (19-20) 
Dysart may know, but the audience does not; at this stage all we know is that 
Dysart has "doubts" (18). The spectators of the play, whose primary 
involvement with the action to this point has been to respond to the "extremity" 
of what Alan has done, are now left with an undefined suspicion that Dysart's 
response will somehow be different, perhaps beyond the boundaries of the 
ethos. The nature of this difference will be made graphically clear in scene 5 
when Dysart, speaking again in soliloquy to the audience, reveals his dream of 
ritual infanticide. 
Dysart's dream is shocking enough—Shaffer's language ensures that: "I 
part the flaps, sever the inner tubes, yank them out and throw them hot and 
steaming on to the floor" (24). It might be inviting for the audience to assume 
here that Dysart's empathy with Alan is based on some sort of identification 
with an "important ritual" of "sacrifice" (24) and mutilation which is deviant 
only according to the standards of the "immovably English," represented later 
in the play by Dysart's own dour, frigid and "worshipless" wife (62). But in the 
dream, Dysart exposes himself as deviant even in the context of his supposedly 
Homeric fantasy. Shaffer seems to insist that his audience consider Dysart's 
nausea, at the sacrifice of the children as an analogue to his previously 
expressed "doubts" about himself as a psychotherapist--"the implied doubt that 
this repetitive and smelly work is doing any social good at all" (25). And in 
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scene 6 Dysart rather conveniently reveals to Hester that "it's [Alan's] face I 
saw on every victim across the stone" (26). Shaffer has told us elsewhere that 
it's not a conflict between leaving the boy as he is and not leaving 
the boy as he is. It's a conflict in having to not leave him as he is 
and, at the same time, possibly to eviscerate him. (Vogue 192; 
second emphasis mine) 
In this way, the playwright is attempting to frame the central conflict of the 
play as the apparent internal conflict of his protagonist. How successful he his 
in doing so in his construction of the literary text may be open to critical 
question. 
For the analogy to work, the audience must accept that psychotherapy 
involves a certain metaphoric disembowelment, and that the sacrifice of Alan's 
passion and his odd form of worship for the sake of reintegration is something 
worth puzzling over. Shaffer himself has contended that "audiences react to 
Equus the way they do partly because, I suspect, they collectively dislike their 
analysts immensely and want some way of showing this in public" (Vogue 192). 
But Equus is hardly some sort of modern Gammer Gurton's Needle, with the 
psychiatrist in the role of the scold. For even if we grant that Shaffer's analogy 
may provoke the audience to some degree because of its shared suspicions of 
psychiatry, it is still true that the disposition of the audience must ultimately 
be that a boy who blinds six horses with a spike should unquestionably be 
treated by psychotherapy, notwithstanding the troubled dreams and soliloquies 
of a particular therapist. Furthermore, whatever sympathies the audience may 
feel for Alan as a "victim" must only serve to reinforce that disposition. 
Discussion of this play has been too laden-over already with 
psychoanalytical baggage, little of which has added to our understanding of 
how the play works. In structural terms, the issue is fairly well settled at the 
point when the audience senses that it will insist that Dysart acquiesce to the 
treatment of Alan, which I contend takes place very early in the play. Purely 
in the terms of Turner's model, Dysart must conform to our expectations of 
redressive action for the play to be anything less than an outrage, or a 
heartbreak. 
In effect, both Shaffer, as the maker of the literary text, and Dysart, as 
an important maker of the theatrical text, must make the decisions which we 
expect them to make; Dysart was correct, then, when he told us that "the 
extremity [of Alan's act] is the point." The play would not make the same 
demands upon us, or upon itself, if Alan were a shoplifter or a petty vandal. 
But since the problem of the play is what Shaffer has given it to us to be, we 
insist that the action on the stage and our expectations about what the action 
ought to be like must ultimately converge. One of the most important things 
Spring 1992 95 
about Equus is that we are never in actual dread that Dysart will refuse to 
treat the boy. 
It is interesting to note at this point an essential contrast between 
Shaffer's management of this structural imperative and the more complex 
sense of foreboding we experience when we are the audience of Shakespearean 
tragedy. When Samuel Johnson observed that the killing of Desdemona "is not 
to be endured" (8:1045), he was giving definition to what effectually makes us 
an audience at that particular moment in Othello. We, as audience, know that 
Desdemona is innocent and we, as audience, want her to be spared the 
slaughter. Interestingly, it is at moments like these, moments at which the 
subjective integrity of the play and the wishes of the viewers diverge, that plays 
like Othello strike true chords of horror in us. Shakespeare had a knack for 
exploiting the structural inevitability of what Hamlet called "the fall of a 
sparrow." His tragedies define the terms of their own inevitability and are 
truly mimetic in the sense that their spectrum of risk may include the wanton 
destruction of innocence, as life does. We may have the impulse at these 
moments to rise from our seats and shout, "No!" But there is no such moment 
in Equus, unless it is at the very beginning of the play when we learn exactly 
what it is that Alan has done. 
It would be wrong to conclude that the killing of Desdemona horrifies us 
simply because it recalls a ritual acting-out of the slaughter of innocence, 
although that resonance must be present in our response. As John Gassner 
pointed out in a lucid discussion of Aristotelian "universals" and plays like the 
Oresteia, "everything we consider universal in these plays was once very 
immediate-socially, politically, psychologically" (113). This does not mitigate 
the Turner model; it serves to suggest how the imperative for redression finds 
expression in the temporal frame of a theatrical performance which, while it 
is like ritual, is not the same as ritual. The defiance of Antigone, the 
abdication of Lear and The Taking ofPelham 123 have all been frightful (and 
thrilling) to their immediate audiences because they are violations of certain 
norms of social, political and cultural order in which the spectators have a 
vested interest and a genuine emotional involvement. The audience's fear is 
a fear of chaos, made accessible to them by the immediacy of the correlative 
action on the stage—an action which is in turn redefined itself by the audience's 
anxiety and dread. 
Similarly, as Shaffer's audience we must fear Alan. For the play to have 
any real impact, we must experience genuine anxiety that his blinding of the 
horses threatens patterns of order that we hold to be important. Otherwise 
the play would be reduced to a sterile rhetorical exercise. Dysart himself 
articulates this fear, albeit ironically: 
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DYSART [sarcastically]: You mean he's dangerous? A violent, 
dangerous madman who's going to run around the country doing it 
again and again? (81) 
Hester's response--'! mean he's in pain, Martin"~may serve to call the 
audience's attention to its own humane sympathies for Alan on a more logical 
level, but the primitive fear must still be there. There must be an 
apprehension that Alan~or some other Alan-might very well "do it again." 
That is why Alan must ultimately be dealt with-not just because we insist that 
he be freed of his pain, but because we insist to be freed of him. 
Dysart's sarcasm seems to me to be indicative of a strategy on Shaffer's 
part to anticipate and contend with the expectations of his audience. But his 
speech actually has the effect, by articulating the fear of unresolved crisis, of 
reaffirming that Dysart is beyond the ethos. The narrative of his shocking 
dream has already caused the audience to dissociate itself from him to some 
extent, a dissociation which goes a step further when Dysart, without any 
apparent motivation other than the whimsy of the moment, reveals the dream 
to Alan (36). The problem is that Dysart's sarcasm and misgivings do not 
offer any alternatives for the resolution of the crisis that Shaffer predicated for 
us at the beginning of the play. Only moments earlier, Dysart has been unable 
to offer any response to Dora's impassioned questions: 
And pte? What about me? . . . It's our fault. Whatever happens, 
we did it. Alan's just a little victim. He's really done nothing at all! 
[Savagely.] What do you have to do in this world to get any 
sympathy-blind animals? (77) 
If Shaffer assumes that the members of his audience "collectively dislike their 
analysts immensely," he has chosen to give this hostility its most cogent 
articulation in a speech which could be read (or heard) as Dora's desperate 
attempt to exonerate herself of responsibility. Yet it seems to me that Dora's 
unanswered questions provide a choral moment, an on-stage expression of the 
audience's building impatience with Dysart's ambivalence, the very ambivalence 
which has served as a playing field for the dialectical tension between the 
frustration and satisfaction of our expectations. 
When the structural imperative is fulfilled at the end of the play, it 
happens in the teeth of Dysart's persistent contempt for "the Normal world" 
and his apparent contempt for his own "surrender" to the very inevitability of 
the solution (108). It is significant that Dysart frames the resolution of the 
problem in the very terms which had earlier served as an acknowledgement of 
the audience's anxiety: "Horses will be quite safe" (108). We are to be spared 
more alarming mutilations, happening "again and again" (81). Our fear of a 
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continuation of the crisis triggered by Alan's deviant behavior has been allayed; 
redressive action has been taken; reintegration~at whatever the cost might be 
to Alan's passion-has been promised. Shaffer involved us in a problem at the 
beginning of the play, and now he has given us its inevitable solution. 
My analysis is not meant to deny the powerful response that Equus, by 
nearly all accounts, has elicited from audiences, but rather to suggest a basis 
for that response. The play is Dysart's play, and he does what we demand that 
he do. The pathos of the play is powerful because Dysart, the agent of 
redression, internalizes the problem that must be solved. It is compelling that 
Shaffer has Dysart speak "directly to the theater" at the conclusion of the play: 
"I stand in the dark with a pick in my hand, striking at heads!" (108). Dysart 
is fascinating because he carries within him the deviance that must be 
accommodated to the "Normal." But it seems clear that the conclusive force 
of the play is that, in the actualization of the theatrical text, the ethos prevails. 
We know that Dysart is a complex and problematical character, but this may 
only serve to add further weight to the satisfaction we feel, as an audience, 
when what we sense is inevitable is brought to pass by Dysart himself, in 
defiance of his own ambivalence and despair. 
Siena College 
Notes 
1. Shaffer's extensive revision of Shrivings and other playscripts reveals his own attention 
to the presumed ethos of his theatergoing public. Gene A. Plunka comments on Shaffer's 
revision throughout his Peter Sliaffer : Roles, Rites and Rituals in the Theater. On Shrivings, see 
Taylor 24-26. Commenting on the changes he made to tailor Amadeus for an American audience, 
Shaffer acknowledged that there are textual revisions which, in effect, "audiences themselves make 
simply by watching plays" ("Scripts" 29). 
2. Marvin Carlson has provided a valuable perspective on recent critical initiatives which 
attempt to apply response and reception theory to theater, and the implications of this work for 
our understanding of audience communities. See Theater Semiotics: Signs of Life xi-25 and 95-
109. 
3.1 have adopted the terminology of "literary text" and "theatrical text" from De Marinis' 
"Dramaturgy of the Spectator." This terminology seems to me to be both useful and concrete. 
Una Chaiidhuri's otherwise significant attempt to advance a "Spectator-response" criticism of 
drama leads to problematic conclusions concerning the textuality of plays because of a lack of 
adequate definitions of the metaphysics of performance and the locus of the text. See 
Chaudhuri's "The Spectator in Drama / Drama in the Spectator." 
4. Chaudhuri discerns a different sort of "implied inevitability" in Equus, based on solutions 
which realistic dramas have conventionally offered for "the familiar dilemmas of democracy"-in 
this case, "the conflict between the individual-part free soul, part social product-and his society" 
(288). 
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